Four years after the state Legislature passed a bailout of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System that will nearly double annual direct contributions to the giant pension fund, a newly released internal report raises the prospect that the infusion of extra dollars may not protect CalSTRS from future disaster.

The 2014 changes in funding required districts to more than double their CalSTRS contributions, phasing in an increase from 8.25 percent of teacher pay in 2013-14 to 19.1 percent in 2020-21. Individual teachers and the state government also were required to pay more. But about 70 percent of the new funding – which will push total annual contributions from nearly $6 billion in 2013-14 to $11 billion in 2021 – is coming from districts.

The assumption in 2014 was that this extra funding was so significant that CalSTRS’ long-term viability was assured. The nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s Office billed the hikes as a “major state accomplishment.”

On Nov. 8, however, the CalSTRS board was presented with a “risk report” that included both upbeat and gloomy scenarios. As Ed Mendel reported on the Calpensions website, the report found that if investment returns met their 7 percent target, CalSTRS’ retirement liabilities would be 100 percent funded by 2046 – a vast improvement on the present 70 percent.

50% chance fund hits point of no return threshold

But whether a 7 percent projected annual return is reasonable isn’t just questioned by pension watchdogs like Stanford professor Joe Nation and former Schwarzenegger policy adviser David Crane. CalSTRS’ number crunchers concluded that “even with the new rate increases, there is still a 50 percent probability that the CalSTRS funding level will drop below 50 percent in the next 30 years, according to 5,000 simulations based on the current asset allocation,” Mendel reported. Going below the 50 percent threshold is considered by many pension experts the point of no return, with little prospect that stricken retirement funds could ever rebound.

The problem for CalSTRS isn’t just consistently hitting or surpassing the 7 percent annual return goal. It’s that as few as one or two bad years of returns have a compound effect on long-term liabilities. The weak performances by CalSTRS and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System when the Great Recession hit more than a decade ago still haunt the funds, which are the two largest government pension agencies in the U.S. CalSTRS went from being 100 percent funded in October 2007 to 60 percent funded in March 2009, according to a Calpensions report.

CalSTRS’ and CalPERS’ grim numbers are a big reason why state Democrats are pushing for major changes in Proposition 13, the state’s landmark 1978 measure capping property tax increases at 2 percent a year. An initiative ending the protection for commercial and industrial properties will be on the 2020 state ballot and has the potential to generate $11 billion in new revenue a year.

School districts growing desperate over budgets

It may be a tough sell in an era in which the state has run surpluses for several years – including a $15.8 billion windfall expected in fiscal 2019-2020. But the “split roll” change sought for Proposition 13 reflects in many ways the deep concerns in the education establishment that the cost of the 2014 CalSTRS bailout is making it increasingly difficult for school districts to craft balanced budgets.

As CalWatchdog reported Oct. 1, one reason that the Legislature adopted new rules on permissible levels of lead in school drinking water that some health experts thought didn’t go nearly far enough was that the California School Boards Association worried that tougher standards would have been far more costly. The new standards for state schools were seen as still leaving students at risk of developing the severe cognitive and behavioral problems associated with children and adolescents being exposed to lead.

As of July, CalSTRS had $224 billion in assets. It would need to have $320 billion in hand to be considered fully funded.

It’s been a tumultuous era in Oakland. The Police Department has been enmeshed in an ugly

But now Oakland is also wrestling with a painfully familiar story: financial turmoil in local schools. The state took some of Oakland Unified’s autonomy in 2003 after the Legislature approved an emergency $100 million loan to the then-reeling district. With $40 million of the loan still unpaid, the state continues to oversee district spending, though with a smaller role. Now there are new indications that even Oakland Unified’s limited autonomy could disappear for another long stretch as school officials struggle to make ends meet yet again.

In recent months, district officials had to approve what were described as “emergency” $9 million cuts in the district’s $521 million general fund 2017-18 budget and to authorize potentially greater reductions in 2018-19 as well. The cuts were widely denounced in public meetings as unnecessary and indicative of poor management.

This criticism has been buttressed by the Fiscal Crisis Management Action Team (FCMAT), the state agency that works with struggling school districts. In an August report, FCMAT warned that a “fiscal emergency” loomed if Oakland Unified officials didn’t quit spending reserve funds to cover budget shortfalls. FCMAT depicted the Oakland school board as irresponsible for approving cumulative raises for teachers of 14.5 percent in the 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 school years in a three-year span in which the cost of living went up by less than 2 percent. These pay hikes were the biggest drain on district reserves.

Oakland board members brought more criticism on themselves in January when they approved 5 percent pay raises for themselves. While the total amounts were small – $39 per board member per month – San Francisco Chronicle columnist Otis Taylor Jr. wrote that district students and parents were appropriately “livid” about the salary boost at a time when schools often lacked funds for basics like toilet paper.

A recent East Bay Times analysis suggested there was plenty of blame to go around for Oakland Unified’s fiscal headaches. It largely absolved district Superintendent Kyla Johnson-Trammel, who took over in January 2017, noting her predecessor had failed to follow through on plans to lay off 42 employees because declining enrollment had left the district with less than 37,000 students. Since enrollment directly determines how much state aid comes to districts, well-run districts usually reduce employees when enrollment drops. With enrollment down 33 percent from its 1999 peak of 55,000, Oakland Unified has thus faced constant pressure to downsize.

Pension costs grow 132% per teacher by 2020

But information distributed by the district before Oakland Unified trustees approved the recent $9 million in cuts pointed to another budget culprit – one that is hammering districts statewide. That is the bailout of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System approved by the Legislature and Gov. Jerry Brown in 2014. It phases in an 80 percent increase in annual contributions to CalSTRS from fiscal 2014-15 to fiscal 2020-21 – going from $5.9 billion a year to $10.9 billion.

More than two-thirds of this additional cost must be borne by local school districts. In 2014-15, they were required to pay 8.25 percent of teacher payroll to CalSTRS. Beginning in fall 2020, that amount will be 19.1 percent – a 132 percent increase in per-teacher pension funding obligations. Even in districts with high numbers of English-language learners – which receive additional funding under the Local Control Funding Formula, a 2013 state law – pension obligations have created major headaches.

School Services of California – a consultant which advises a large majority of the state’s 1,000 school districts – estimated last July that at least 280 districts would struggle to pay bills in the 2017-18 school year. A San Jose Mercury-News analysis at the time suggested that the just-ended 2016-17 school year might be looked back on in 10 years “as the last good year in recent times for public education.”

The August 2017 FCMAT report on Oakland Unified raised additional concerns about why the district would struggle with its finances in coming years beyond inadequate funding. FCMAT faulted the district for inadequate internal budget controls, for allowing significant expenditures without board approval and for inadequate training of officials with budget responsibilities.