Next fiscal year, Newsom wants to give $3 billion to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System. He also proposes giving up to $5.9 billion over four years to the California State Teachers’ Retirement System.

Both funds have less than 70 percent of the assets they will need to pay off promised pensions. Last year, CalSTRS’ unfunded liability was estimated to be $107.3 billion and CalPERS’ was put at $136 billion. Some see Newsom’s proposal as a confirmation of the failure of ballyhooed efforts by Gov. Jerry Brown and the Legislature to reform pensions and shore up the pension giants.

In 2012, they enacted the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA). It changed retirement terms for state employees hired after Jan. 1, 2013, by limiting what types of pay would apply toward pensions and by making small reductions to benefit calculation formulas and pushing back when employees could retire.

Brown hailed the law’s passage as a significant first step toward Sacramento bringing pension costs under control.

The next significant step came in 2014, when the Legislature and Brown approved a bailout of CalSTRS. It gradually raised the $5.7 billion that school districts, the state and teachers contributed to CalSTRS in 2013-14 to $11 billion in 2020-21, when the phased-in increases were complete. Districts have to pay for 70 percent of the new contributions, with the state picking up 20 percent and teachers 10 percent.

‘Significant’ CalSTRS changes didn’t stabilize fund

The nonpartisan state Legislative Analyst’s Office described the funding law as a “significant” accomplishment with promise to keep CalSTRS on firm ground for decades to come.

But as Brown’s second term wore on, with CalPERS alternating between poor and relatively successful years with its investments, it became clear that the 2012 pension reform measure hadn’t changed the grim long-term picture for CalPERS’ finances. A 2017 Pensions & Investment report detailed how CalPERS’ 10-year record of 4.4 percent average returns wasn’t keeping up with its obligations and noted that in one poor investment year alone, CalPERS saw its unfunded liabilities soar by $27.3 billion.

And the LAO soon changed its tone on the CalSTRS bailout. In 2016, its analysts warned that liabilities continued to increase. And in November, as CalWatchdog reported, an internal CalSTRS analysis concluded there was a 50 percent chance that CalSTRS’ funding would drop to less than 50 percent over the next 30 years. Pension analysts note that few pension systems ever recover from dropping below the 50 percent level.

Perhaps the most significant hope for pension reform from the Brown era came as the surprise result of a legal challenge to some of the limits on pensions for new hires in the 2012 law. A public safety union argued that this was a violation of the “California rule,” the long-standing court precedent that held pension benefits could not be reduced for public employees without comparable additional benefits being provided.

But two appellate courts not only disagreed with the lawsuit’s premise, they held the “California rule” of inviolate pensions didn’t apply to years not yet worked by public employees, and that cheaper benefits could be collectively bargained.

The California Supreme Court held a hearing on the lawsuit last month and a decision is expected in coming weeks.

Four years after the state Legislature passed a bailout of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System that will nearly double annual direct contributions to the giant pension fund, a newly released internal report raises the prospect that the infusion of extra dollars may not protect CalSTRS from future disaster.

The 2014 changes in funding required districts to more than double their CalSTRS contributions, phasing in an increase from 8.25 percent of teacher pay in 2013-14 to 19.1 percent in 2020-21. Individual teachers and the state government also were required to pay more. But about 70 percent of the new funding – which will push total annual contributions from nearly $6 billion in 2013-14 to $11 billion in 2021 – is coming from districts.

The assumption in 2014 was that this extra funding was so significant that CalSTRS’ long-term viability was assured. The nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s Office billed the hikes as a “major state accomplishment.”

On Nov. 8, however, the CalSTRS board was presented with a “risk report” that included both upbeat and gloomy scenarios. As Ed Mendel reported on the Calpensions website, the report found that if investment returns met their 7 percent target, CalSTRS’ retirement liabilities would be 100 percent funded by 2046 – a vast improvement on the present 70 percent.

50% chance fund hits point of no return threshold

But whether a 7 percent projected annual return is reasonable isn’t just questioned by pension watchdogs like Stanford professor Joe Nation and former Schwarzenegger policy adviser David Crane. CalSTRS’ number crunchers concluded that “even with the new rate increases, there is still a 50 percent probability that the CalSTRS funding level will drop below 50 percent in the next 30 years, according to 5,000 simulations based on the current asset allocation,” Mendel reported. Going below the 50 percent threshold is considered by many pension experts the point of no return, with little prospect that stricken retirement funds could ever rebound.

The problem for CalSTRS isn’t just consistently hitting or surpassing the 7 percent annual return goal. It’s that as few as one or two bad years of returns have a compound effect on long-term liabilities. The weak performances by CalSTRS and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System when the Great Recession hit more than a decade ago still haunt the funds, which are the two largest government pension agencies in the U.S. CalSTRS went from being 100 percent funded in October 2007 to 60 percent funded in March 2009, according to a Calpensions report.

CalSTRS’ and CalPERS’ grim numbers are a big reason why state Democrats are pushing for major changes in Proposition 13, the state’s landmark 1978 measure capping property tax increases at 2 percent a year. An initiative ending the protection for commercial and industrial properties will be on the 2020 state ballot and has the potential to generate $11 billion in new revenue a year.

School districts growing desperate over budgets

It may be a tough sell in an era in which the state has run surpluses for several years – including a $15.8 billion windfall expected in fiscal 2019-2020. But the “split roll” change sought for Proposition 13 reflects in many ways the deep concerns in the education establishment that the cost of the 2014 CalSTRS bailout is making it increasingly difficult for school districts to craft balanced budgets.

As CalWatchdog reported Oct. 1, one reason that the Legislature adopted new rules on permissible levels of lead in school drinking water that some health experts thought didn’t go nearly far enough was that the California School Boards Association worried that tougher standards would have been far more costly. The new standards for state schools were seen as still leaving students at risk of developing the severe cognitive and behavioral problems associated with children and adolescents being exposed to lead.

As of July, CalSTRS had $224 billion in assets. It would need to have $320 billion in hand to be considered fully funded.

The California Public Employees Retirement System and the California State Teachers Retirement System recently announced that they had exceeded their investment goals by at least 1 percentage point in fiscal 2017-18, with CalPERS citing annual gains of 8.6 percent and CalSTRS reporting 9 percent returns.

This came after strong returns in 2016-17 as well for both of the pension giants. But even with CalPERS now reporting $355 billion in assets and CalSTRS $225 billion, both systems have 70 percent or less of funds needed to cover their long-term commitments.

This troubling long-term picture is why the League of California Cities, in a January report, said it expects CalPERS to keep raising rates on local governments for years to come until they become “unsustainable.” CalSTRS, meanwhile, relies on the Legislature to set the rates it charges workers, districts and the state for pension costs – and the bailout the Legislature approved in 2014 that sharply increased what districts in particular must pay has not shored up the system nearly as much as was hoped.

Against this backdrop, CalPERS and CalSTRS are offering hints that they aren’t happy with the Legislature and think it is making their jobs more difficult.

CalSTRS’ chief investment officer, Christopher Ailman, issued a statement about the good returns that downplayed their significance: “We will rank high compared to similar funds, but it is only one year. We need to repeat that performance year in and year out, on average, over the next 30 years.”

But in an interview with the Private Equity International website that was posted July 2, Ailman elaborated on his view of investment gains. He did so in a way that challenged claims made by many Democratic lawmakers and pro-pension groups such as the Californians for Retirement Security that state pensions’ biggest problem was the Wall Street crash of a decade ago.

CalSTRS exec: Don’t blame investment results

“Ailman points out it’s often not the investment results that have led to the underfunding, it’s either poor management of liabilities or a lack of contributions,” the article said.

“Asked whether this keeps him up at night, he says he sleeps like a baby – wakes up and screams every three hours. ‘We pay out half a billion dollars a month in benefit payments, more than we bring in.’”

In the interview, Ailman also complained about Assembly Bill 2833, a state law that took effect last year that requires pension systems to disclose more information about expenses and fees related to their investments. He said the law ignored existing disclosure requirements and that it had caused CalSTRS to miss out on lucrative opportunities.

He said the “extra rules and extra issues” were having unintended but negative effects.

“We now have a situation in the state of California where CalPERS and CalSTRS have less invested in Silicon Valley than the Dutch, Asian and Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds. Fundamentally, as a native Californian I think that’s just so wrong, but I can’t change people’s minds. It is what it is now,” Ailman told Private Equity International.

CalPERS knocks bill to monitor divestment laws

CalPERS’ concerns about legislative actions are also plain, if more muted. The Pensions & Investments website reported July 18 that the pension fund opposes Senate Bill 783, which already passed the Senate and now is before the Assembly. It would set up a review body to analyze how CalPERS and CalSTRS had complied with state laws directing the pension funds to divest from certain industries. CalPERS says this review panel would duplicate the work of pension staffers.

Given that CalPERS and CalSTRS at times have resisted the Legislature’s attempts to micromanage their portfolios, SB783 could be seen as giving teeth to lawmakers’ attempts to have a bigger say in investments.

The debate over SB783 comes as CalSTRS faces demands from activists to divest in a new corner of the private sector: companies which run private prisons. Other recent calls for divestment have targeted assault-rifle makers; finance companies that helped with construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline; and fossil-fuel companies.

A key moment, buried amid nearly 13 hours of recorded meetings, came when CalPERS’ Chief Investment Officer Ted Eliopoulos played a short interview video with Wall Street experts, including famed investor Warren Buffett, opining on the expected investment returns in coming years. One investment guru thought a 4 percent or 5 percent rate of return would be the objective. Buffett pointed to very slow growth in the economy.

Eliopoulos used a diagram showing a 30-year decline in interest rates, even as discount rates used by pension funds remained steady. CalPERS currently calculates its pension liabilities based on an expected return rate of 7.5 percent. Based on the data provided by CalPERS staff, it’s clear the agency would need to ramp up its risk taking to have any chance to continually meet such goals. In the past year, CalPERS’ return rate was 0.6 percent.

Longtime pension-reform advocate Daniel Pellissier, president of California Pension Reform in Sacramento, praised the CalPERS staff for its bout of truth telling, given that such predictions are not what the current system’s defenders want to hear. “I’d like to think they actually have a conscience and they understand the role they play,” he said. “What do you do when you’re facing flat returns for years ahead and liabilities are rising?”

The staff is “pushing the board to do the right thing,” Pellissier added. “Some board members are essentially saying to staff: Make me do the right thing.” The “right thing,” in Pellissier’s view, is to further reduce the expected return rates to more closely match market performance. He compares the situation to 1999, when CalPERS officials did not sound the alarm bells about the looming costs that would follow SB400, the law that led to 15 years of statewide retroactive pension increases and that still plagues the system to this day.

At least one CalPERS board member complained about the cost of reducing the discount rate. There’s no doubt that doing so means that California cities will face costly spikes in their payments. But in reality, the costs are already there. State and local governments have already made pension promises to public employees. The courts have consistently enforced the so-called “California Rule,” which stops agencies from lowering benefits for current employees, even going forward.

The question, according to reformers like Pellissier, is how forthright state officials will be in accounting for the size of the pension-related debt. Few dispute the essential point: Governments have undercharged municipalities for the cost of pension benefits, possibly for decades. They have to keep those promises. The “unfunded pension liability” is essentially the debt – the difference between what’s promised and the available funds.

In the private sector, employees typically receive defined-contribution plans, generally 401(k)-style benefits. The employee contributes a certain percentage into a fund. Sometimes the employer matches a portion of the contribution. The money is invested in mutual funds. When the market does well, the employee reaps the benefits. When it does poorly, the employee endures the downside. The employee uses whatever is in the fund for retirement. There are no “liabilities.”

The government pension plans that CalPERS manages are an entirely different animal. Agencies make benefit promises to employees based on a formula. For instance, most public-safety officials (police, fire, prison guards) in California receive “3 percent at 50.” That means they retire with 3 percent of their final years’ pay times the number of years worked, available at age 50 – plus myriad pension “enhancements” added at the end of the career. That level — 90 percent or more of final pay — is guaranteed, no matter what.

This explains the heated debate over investment-return predictions. If the market does well, there are fewer forecast debts. If it does poorly, those liabilities soar. Because taxpayers are pledged to backfill any shortfalls, it’s a highly political issue. Additionally, critics note that the CalPERS board is dominated by union officials whose members benefit from painting as rosy a scenario as possible about the future investment performance.

Union officials argue the system is fine and that, despite recent poor performance, CalPERS does well over time. Returns have been terrible since 2014, but outperformed predictions between 2009 and 2013. But even the CalPERS staff’s presentation suggests it’s unrealistic to bank on continuing 7.5 percent return rates in the current market.

As Pensions & Investments reported, “Andrew Junkin, president of Wilshire Consulting, the pension fund’s general investment consultant, told the committee its firm estimates the pension fund’s annualized investment return over the next decade will be 6.2 percent, down 90 basis points from the 10-year forecast Wilshire made a year ago of 7.1 percent.” The publication noted that CalPERS could vote on a rate reduction in February.

Pension-reform advocates aren’t the only ones raising the ghost of SB400 in the current context. “It’s time to put SB400, the 1999 California legislation that changed benefits for public workers, behind us,” argued CalPERS board members Richard Costigan, Dana Hollinger and Bill Slaton in a September column. “That bill … was a product of its time. Retirement security is too important today to get caught in a debate about the past. When SB400 became law, CalPERS was 137 percent funded.”

They vowed to examine the situation in light of the current, tougher economic climate. The staff presentation at the recent Board of Administration meetings suggest those words were more than public relations. Top CalPERS officials seem to recognize the size of the looming problem. The real test will come in December committee meetings and at the next board confab. But it’s increasingly likely that return predictions are headed downward.

Steven Greenhut is Western region director for the R Street Institute. Write to him at sgreenhut@street.org.

As part of an arrangement that includes four years of funding increases, a two-year tuition freeze and additional money for UC’s sizable pension debt, the university is undertaking a significant overhaul of its retirement system. Though details remain to be worked out, it will introduce a pension tier with a dramatically lower compensation cap, and could shift new hires from a guaranteed benefit to a 401(k)-style defined contribution plan. …

 

Under the deal, UC will adopt a state limit on the amount of employees’ salaries that are used to calculate their guaranteed pension. The limit, which would be adjusted for inflation, now stands at $117,000. The current cap for UC workers, based on a federal ceiling, is $265,000.

The seriousness of the UC pension problem has gotten relatively little attention until now, but as CalPensions’ Ed Mendel pointed out in May, UC has had to engage in risky borrowing to pay its bills:

Four years ago UC began borrowing to help close the pension funding gap. By last July UC had borrowed $1.8 billion from internal sources and $937 million more from external sources.

 

Borrowing to pay pension costs can pay off in another way, if money loaned at a low interest rate is invested and earns a higher rate. The UC pension fund, valued at $52.8 billion last June, is expected to earn 7.5 percent a year, which critics say is too optimistic.

 

The “arbitrage” looks good so far. Last fiscal year the UC pension fund returned earnings of 17.8 percent. The UC short term investment pool, the source of the internal borrowing, earned about 1.5 percent.

 

But borrowing to pay pension costs is a gamble. The city of Stockton sold $125 million worth of pension obligation bonds in 2007 and put the money in its CalPERS investment fund, just in time for big losses during the recession and stock market crash.

UC employees pay bigger share of pension costs than CA teachers

To help get UC pensions on firm ground, UC officials have agreed in recent years to an arrangement in which the university system pays 14 percent of its payroll toward pension costs and individual employees contribute 8 percent of their gross pay. This means taxpayers foot 64 percent of the costs.

This is in contrast with the new standards for state teacher pensions enacted in 2014 as part of a law to shore up the struggling California State Teachers’ Retirement System. The contribution changes are being phased in through the 2020-21 fiscal year. When they are complete, teachers will contribute 10.25 percent of their paychecks, school districts will contribute 19.1 percent and the state government will contribute 8.8 percent. This means taxpayers will pay for 73 percent of the costs of teacher pensions.

Under the old status quo, taxpayers paid for about 63 percent of total CalSTRS contributions. So while teachers will pay somewhat more toward their pensions because of the CalSTRS fix, taxpayers will pay a significantly bigger share.

This doesn’t reflect the broad pension reform goals that Gov. Brown announced in 2012. He proposed that the state and its employees split the “normal” cost of pensions. In pension-speak, that refers to the value of retiree health care earned during a year of working, as determined by actuarial standards. The “normal” cost doesn’t include the cost going forward of dealing with a pension system’s unfunded liabilities, only the cost per specific employee.

The UC pension deal seems likely to move UC toward that goal of splitting “normal” costs, especially if enough new hires accept a hybrid benefits plan. But at least until June 30, 2021, the state is legally committed to a deal with public school teachers that goes away from that goal.

So against this backdrop, what does the L.A. Times’ Chris Megerian come up with for a big overview of how California is functioning? A sunny story with this headline: “California’s economic stability leaves Gov. Brown a new challenge.” Its message? This guy is a genius! If only he could get more support in the Legislature!

“Gray Davis, a fellow Democrat, was recalled by voters as state finances imploded following an energy crisis. Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger limped out of office with rock-bottom poll numbers, leaving a pile of debt.

“But on Brown’s watch, deficits have become surpluses, helped along by tax hikes the governor persuaded voters to approve. More money is being pumped into schools.

“University tuition has stabilized.

“Budget standoffs that once dragged through the summer are now wrapped up by the June deadline, lending the Capitol a new sense of orderliness. And on Wednesday, the governor called a special legislative session to prod lawmakers to pass his plan for saving money and paying off debt.

“That record, which will be a major part of Brown’s reelection campaign, is due partly to good fortune. California is benefiting from a nationwide economic recovery that has helped flood the state with revenue. Brown is also blessed with a Capitol dominated by fellow Democrats and a 2010 rule change that lowered the number of votes needed to pass a spending plan.”

A worship of process, an indifference to the real world

So if you read this story in a vacuum, you would believe that California had a healthy economy. That’s just not true.

You would also believe California has budget surpluses. That’s just not true. California has at least $200 billion in unfunded pension and health care oblgations to retired employees. The governor declines to ask the Legislature to provide even close to the actuarial minimum to fund these obligations. How does he finesse official budget documents to sustain the myth that the state has budget surpluses? With Enron-style accounting.

What’s going on here? How can the state with the worst poverty rate in the nation and staggering debt be depicted as nirvana?

Contrary to some libertarians and conservatives in California, I really don’t think it’s the West Coast version of Obamaphilia, where gigantic screw-ups and scandals are ignored because of idolatry and partisanship. (Do you really think the IRS hassling and impeding hundreds of conservative nonprofits during a presidential election year would be covered as it’s been if Bush were sill president and the nonprofits were liberal?)

Mainly, I think it’s a reflection of how stunned the Sacramento press corps was by the post-Pete Wilson dysfunction — the decade preceding Brown’s return to the governor’s office in which the Legislature couldn’t even pass a budget on time year after year after year.

Now that Brown, aided by Proposition 25, is able to get budgets passed, the absence of this chaos seems miraculous to the Sacramento media.

RIP, skeptical journalism. At least in Sacramento.

But instead of just giving the governor credit for restoring order to the budget process, they give him much broader credit for California’s rebound and its “economic stability.”

But what rebound? Nearly one-quarter of the state is in poverty, a much worse rate than West Virginia and Mississippi.

And what “economic stability”? If a household ignored its gigantic credit-card debts, mom and dad could pretend they were thriving. But are they really thriving?

Of course not.

In our idealized “All the President’s Men” conception of journalism, we believe that journalists hunt for discrepancies between what our leaders tell us and what is the truth. But in Sacramento, our journalists do no such thing. Instead, they put on the blinders, and reflect the view expressed in another classic 1970s movie.

Remain calm! All is well!

I groused about it in this U-T San Diego editorial:

“Imagine a family in which both parents work and make $100,000 a year between them but have $300,000 in steadily growing credit-card debt. If the parents got raises and their income increased to $110,000 a year, would you say the family is suddenly in good shape financially? Of course not.

“But that sort of happy talk is just what we’re hearing from state leaders after an upbeat report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office predicted a coming era of budget surpluses because of revenue from tax hikes and a surge in capital-gains tax receipts, thanks to Wall Street’s latest boom.

“The 62-page report mentions the state’s massive unfunded liabilities for the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System only briefly.”

Reporters don’t connect budget happy talk with pension gloom

What’s amazing is that the same Sacramento reporters who have covered Gov. Jerry Brown’s efforts to win pension reform don’t connect the dots. If Brown says pension benefits are a toxic, long-term, unaffordable fiscal nightmare, how can that be squared with Mac Taylor’s fiscal happy talk? It can’t be.

Here’s Mac:

“We now find that California’s state budget situation is even more promising than we projected one year ago. The state’s budgetary condition is stronger than at any point in the past decade.”

Here’s me:

“As of September, CalPERS had about $260 billion in assets and about $340 billion in liabilities. Those numbers are based on CalPERS’ assumption that decades of investment returns will average 7.5 percent annual growth.

“But a comprehensive 2011 study overseen by Joe Nation, a professor at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and a former Democratic state lawmaker, concluded assumptions of 5 percent to 6 percent are more historically appropriate. In September, Nation said a more realistic assessment of CalPERS’ current unfunded liability is $170 billion — not $80 billion. …

“The Legislative Analyst’s Office’s report simply doesn’t contemplate what state budgets would look like in coming years if they addressed and paid down the state’s share of CalPERS’ unfunded liability. Instead, it only predicts a slow growth in annual contributions to $2.8 billion by 2019-20 — meaning the total unfunded liability will continue to grow by billions each year.”

In even worse shape than CalPERS: CalSTRS

“CalSTRS is in even worse shape than CalPERS. The state teachers’ pension system reports assets of $172 billion and an unfunded liability of $70 billion. But it too uses the 7.5 percent projection for investment returns. Even with that questionable assumption, CalSTRS is on track to run out of funds in 2043. If Nation’s more prudent model were followed, CalSTRS’ unfunded liability would double, and it would run out of funds long before 2043.

“Once again, the LAO report doesn’t contemplate what state budgets would look like in coming years if they addressed and paid down CalSTRS’ unfunded liability. Even if the optimistic 7.5 percent earnings estimate is used, it’s been estimated that CalSTRS needs $4.5 billion a year for 30 years to dig out of its financial hole. Yet the LAO only predicts a slow increase of state funding to $1.8 billion in 2019-2020.”

I have whined an awful lot about the state media in recent months. They keep giving me fresh fodder.

How can reporters covering Sacramento not realize that they can’t simultaneously believe that the state government is in good shape fiscally and that it faces an enormous long-term crisis in paying for unfunded retirement benefits?

It’s truly bizarre, because this isn’t a case like fracking or AB 32 where there’s a green agenda driving coverage. Instead, it’s just the laziest pack journalism imaginable.

This is important for California because something around half of the state budget — the total amount — comes from the federal government. When the feds begin cutting back spending sharply, as inevitably they will, then California will see sharp cuts in Medicaid/Medical, AFDC, SNAP/food stamps (more than the recent cuts), education/No Child Left Behind/Race to the Top, etc.

Kotlikoff recently was interviewed by Financial Sense Newshour. And Bob Wenzel provides a transcript of some of it:

Officially, the federal deficit is $17 trillion. Where is it really more than $205 trillion?

Kotlikoff:

The liabilities the government owes are mostly off the books. We have a true debt picture which is about $205 trillion. This is recording all the future obligations the government has, whether they are official obligations or not, such as paying for your social security benefits, mine, or your mother’s Medicare benefits, defense spending, etc. All of these things are really obligations that aren’t recorded on the books as debt, whereas paying off future principal and interest payments on Treasury bills and bonds are recorded. So, anyway, if you take the value of all of those commitments and subtract all the taxes coming to pay those commitments, the difference is what’s called the fiscal gap; and that fiscal gap in the U.S. is now $205 trillion. So, the true debt is $205 trillion; the official debt is only $17 trillion. So, most of the problems we’re facing, most of the debt we have, the vast majority of it is off the books and Congress has done bookkeeping to make sure the public doesn’t see it.

Why is that not well known?

Kotlikoff:

The Clinton administration—we put out the fiscal gap studies for a couple of years on the President’s budget. The Clinton administration then censored it. The guys who’s now head of the National Economic Council, the Chief Economic Advisor to President Obama, was the one who did the censorship back in 1994. President Bush’s Treasury Secretary O’Neil wanted us to do a fiscal gap accounting for the President’s budget in 2003 and he was fired in December 7, 2002, and that study was censored two days after he was fired. So, this is not accidental. This is more or less a conspiracy to hide the truth to keep ourselves and our kids in the dark about what the politicians are really doing, which is trying to garner the votes of older people and then get reelected and leave a bigger mess for our kids to handle.

But the bills are starting to come due as the Baby Boomers keep retiring.